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stock or securities for all or part of another corporation's assets.01 With
the latter type of reorganization, the shareholders of the acquiring corpora-
tion have no recourse to the appraisal remedy under the law of most
jurisdictions; and, in one-quarter of the states, even the shareholders of the
acquired corporation cannot invoke the appraisal remedy.0 2 Thus it appears
that Woodward and Hilton could seriously impair the effectiveness of
statutory appraisal remedies as protective devices for the interests of the
minority shareholder.
E. CADER HOWARD
Labor Law-Issuance of Injunction to End Strike in Breach of
Arbitration Agreement
Since the turn of this century, Congress and the United States Su-
preme Court have endeavored to balance the respective powers of labor
and management. Whenever the scales tipped more favorably towards one
group than the other, the reaction has been to establish equilibrium either
legislatively or judicially. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
7701 is a striking example of this balancing process. The Supreme Court
held that a federal district court could enjoin a strike in breach of a col-
lective bargaining agreement despite section four of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which prohibits the granting of federal injunctions in labor-manage-
ment disputes. Significantly, the Court reversed Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,2 in which it had held to the contrary. Boys Markets points up
the unfortunate situation produced by the interaction of the Norris-
LaGuardia8 and Taft-Hartley Acts.'
Norris-LaGuardia was occasioned by the massive intervention of the
judiciary into labor-management relations.' Prior to its enactment, a
strike seemingly was labor's most potent weapon; however, management
a" INT. PV. CODE, of 1954, § 354(a) (1) provides: "No gain or loss shall be
recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are,
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities
in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."2 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATE AcgnsiroNs
AND MERGERS § 2501[2] (1970).
1398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2370 U.S. 195 (1962).
*29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
'29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964).
'See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTiON
(1932).
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easily countered any strike with an injunction, usually granted with little
reluctance by federal courts not particularly disposed to labor's cause.6
Section four of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act7 prohibited federal courts
from enjoining strikes growing out of labor disputes. 8 The 1935 Wagner
Act9 also aided labor by including a federal guarantee of the right to self-
organization and to engage in collective action-including the strike. In
order to restore the balance lost and to place labor and management on a
more equal footing, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.' 0 Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Amendments opened "the federal courts to suits for
violations of collective bargaining agreements and, thereby, facilitated
enforcement of such contracts by removing some of the procedural dis-
abilities blocking suits against unions in state courts."" Taft-Hartley
reflected congressional desire to promote industrial peace and harmony
through increased enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.'2 Ac-
cordingly, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln MillsI ' the Supreme Court
' State courts generally would not issue injunctions against peaceful picketing
for economic gains. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ;
Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). However, since the
employer was usually a Delaware corporation, the federal courts would issue in-
junctions exercising their jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship. See generally
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1932).
729 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
8 Although Norris-LaGuardia reflected a laissez-faire policy on the part of
government with regards to labor relations, it clearly served to give labor a larger
arsenal in its struggle against management. Wellington & Albert, Statutory Inter-
pretation and the Political Process: A Conent on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE
L.J. 1547, 1555 (1963).
0 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964). Indeed, Taft-Hartley could be classified as pro-
management in a number of ways: It guaranteed the right to the employee to
refrain from union activity; it made it unlawful for a union to restrain or coerce
employees who did not want to strike; it outlawed the closed-shop agreement; and
it prohibited the secondary boycott.
" Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln
Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. Rxv. 32, 34 (1969). For example, the
common law rules of many states frustrated any and all attempts to serve process
and execute judgment against unions, whereas employers were easily sued. Id.12 Id.
1 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to compel an employer to arbitrate grievances
in accordance with the arbitration clause of the agreement in question. Speaking
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gave added significance to section 301 by directing the federal courts to
fashion a body of federal common law to deal with subsequent suits.
1 4
The Court was not only desirous of achieving effective enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, but also encouraged the development
of a uniform system of labor law. 5
Inevitably, the development of federal law under section 301 and the
anti-injunction provisions of section four of Norris-LaGuardia were
destined to clash. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson provided an appro-
priate field for the ensuing struggle. Section four emerged victorious;
the Court held that federal courts were prohibited from enjoining labor
strikes even though a collective bargaining agreement enforceable under
section 301 had been violated. This decision seemed to fly in the face of
the Court's pronouncement in Lincoln Mills; a remedy available in most
state courts 7 was denied a party in federal court.
The majority in Sinclair relied heavily on the legislative history of
section 301 to demonstrate that the anti-injunction provision of Norris-
LaGuardia was still viable and therefore controlled the disposition of the
case. This legislative analysis, when combined with a literal reading of sec-
for the majority, Justice Douglas explained that "the kinds of acts which had given
rise to abuse of the power to enjoin are listed in . 4 of [Norris-LaGuardia]. The
failure to arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act
was aimed." Id. at 458. Many commentators suggest that Taft-Hartley impliedly
repealed Norris-LaGuardia. Thus began what many regard as the encroachment of
section 301 on the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301:
The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric of National Labor
Policy, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 980, 984-85 (1969).
" The Court stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more
than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agree-
ments on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be best obtained in that way .... We would undercut the Act and
defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction
over labor organizations.
353 U.S. at 455-56.
11 The development of federal susbtantive law under this mandate has been
arduous for three reasons: (1) the power of the court to enjoin certain acts con-
flicted with the federal anti-injunction laws; (2) the scope of federal jurisdiction
under section 301 was unclear; and (3) the courts were given insufficient procedural
guidelines to develop effectively the federal law of labor arbitration. Note, Federal
Enforcement of Grievance Arbitration Provisions Under the Doctrine of Lincoln
Mills, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1139, 1145 (1958).
18370 U.S. 195 (1962).
'T Although twenty-four states do have "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" on their
books, ten do not apply their acts to strikes in breach of collective bargaining con-
tracts. Keene, supra note 11, at 49.
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tion four,"" enabled the Court to conclude that Congress did not want fed-
eral courts to intefere in labor disputes involving strikes that were in breach
of collective bargaining agreements. However, Justice Brennan, dissenting,
articulated the theory of judicial accommodation, which later proved more
formidable than the majority's logic. While conceding that "[S]ection
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not, for purposes of actions brought under
it, 'repeal' section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," Brennan recognized
that "the two provisions do co-exist and that they apply ... in apparently
conflicting senses."'" He visualized the Court's duty as seeking out "that
accommodation of the two which will give the fullest effect to the central
purposes of both." 20 The result would be to place section 301 actions
beyond the ambit of the anti-injunction provision of Norris-LaGuardia.
2 1
Brennan's dissent in Sinclair ultimately became the ratio decidendi in
Boys Markets, in which the employer and the union were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement that provided that all disputes should be
resolved by arbitration and that during the life of the agreement, there
should be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boy-
cotts."122 A controversy arose when one of the employer's supervisors
and several non-union employees began to rearrange products in the
frozen food counter in one of the employer's supermarkets.2" A union
representative insisted that the counter be emptied and restocked by union
personnel. When the employer did not yield to the union's demand, a
strike was called and the union began picketing the employer's establish-
ment. The employer immediately requested that the union terminate the
picketing and resort to the arbitration procedures set forth in the agree-
"' See note 7 supra.
19 370 U.S. at 215-16.
20 Id. at 216.
" Brennan apparently thought that reading the two acts together would do little
damage to section four, whereas section 301 would be significantly harmed if
accommodation was not allowed. Representative of the accommodation theory is
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40
(1957), in which the Court concluded that there "must be an accommodation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purposes
in the enactment of each is preserved." A theory similar to accommodation is that
even if Congress rejected express repeal of Norris-LaGuardia by Taft-Hartley,
it did not mean that Congress intended to apply Norris-LaGuardia literally in
derogation of the articulated policies of Taft-Hartley. Congress may have intended
to leave to judicial interpretation the extent to which equitable remedies should be
available in section 301 suits. Note, Strikes and Boycotts: Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act Held to Prohibit Federal Court Injunction of Strike Over an Arbi-
trable Grievance, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 247, 249-50 (1962).
22 398 U.S. at 239.
23 Id.
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ment. Met with refusal, the employer obtained a temporary restraining
order in state court forbidding continuation of the strike. The union
removed the entire matter to a federal district court and requested that
the restraining order be dissolved. Concluding that the dispute was
subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, the
district court denied the union's request, held that the strike was in viola-
lion' of the agreement, and ordered the parties to arbitrate.24 The Supreme
Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
district court order and overruled Sinclair.
Boys Markets will no doubt be applauded as one of the most benef-
icent labor decisions bestowed upon management in recent years. For
one thing, the questionable result yielded by the interaction of Sinclair with
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, I.A.M. & A.W.25 will no longer
plague management. In Avco the Court allowed a union to remove to
federal courte8 a state court action brought by the employer to enjoin the
union from striking. Upon removal, the federal court typically denied
the injunction in keeping with section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
even though the state court, from which the action was removed, could
have issued the injunction.27 Thus, state court jurisdiction was effectively
eliminated where management sought an injunction to end a strike in
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. After Boys Markets if the
union removes to federal court, management will be able to obtain an in-
junction in a federal court. Moreover, the negative effect that Sinclair
had upon arbitration will no longer be present.28 The employer was with-
"Id. at 240.
25390 U.S. 557 (1968).
2628 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964), provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
*" There is a split of authority in this area. Some courts have said the language
of section four means there is no jurisdiction in the federal courts if only an in-
junction was sought and therefore have remanded the case to the state court.
Others have held to the contrary. Compare In re New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 276 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) with Sealtest
Foods-Branch 443 v. Conrad, 262 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.N.Y. 1966). See also General
Elec. Co. v. Local 191, 413 F.2d 964 (1969); Day-Brite Lighting Div. v. I.B.E.W.,
303 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
1 Sinclair's negative effect upon arbitration defeated the policy underlying the
Court's opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
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out remedy in federal court when the union refused to comply with their
contractual agreements, thereby generating little incentive for the employer
to agree to arbitrate.
The Court in Boys Markets could have chosen to extend Sinclair
to the states29 consistent with the establishment of a national system
of labor law.30 By precluding federal courts from issuing injunctions for
breach of contracts not to strike, the Court in Sinclair made state courts
the preferred forum by employers, and thus seriously impaired the volume
of federal court suits and the opportunity for federal development of a
uniform interpretation of labor-management contracts. However, the
Court realized that extending Sinclair to the states would hamper the
effectiveness of section 301 in promoting the speedy enforcement of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Moreover, such an extension, while estab-
lishing uniformity, would unnecessarily give labor the upper hand over
management. Stressing the importance of arbitrations ' as the overriding
consideration in labor-management disputes, the Court chose another, less
absolute method of achieving uniformity-federal courts should be able
to issue injunctions as well as state courts. Logically, the decision is
appealing; concurrent jurisdiction in the area of labor law* is preserved,
and the necessity for forum shopping is obviated."2 Furthermore, a certain
symmetry in the law is maintained, which serves to foster federal-state
relations in an area of national concern.
Although Boys Markets may herald a new era in labor-management
relations, a caveat is appropriate for those who would'read the decision
broadly. The case does not stand for the proposition that access to the
federal courts will now be allowed to any employer seeking to enjoin a
union from striking in breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The
Court made explicit the limited nature of its holding:
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In these cases, the Court held that where the issue
constitutes an arbitrable grievance, federal court authority did not extend beyond
determining the existence of a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration
clause and determining whether there was an allegation that a provision of that
agreement had been violated. The courts may not replace the judgment of the
arbitrator with their own, nor may they refuse to act, because, in their opinion, a
claim is frivolous or unwarranted. Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10
U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 292, 337 (1963).
"' The Court raised this possibility: "ilt is undoubtedly true that each of the
foregoing objections to Sinclair-Avco could, be remedied either by overruling,
Sinclair or by extending that decision to the States." 398 U.S. at 247.
'0 See note 37 infra.
3 398 U.S. at 243, 252.
82 The result would also have been obtained if Sinclair had been extended to the
states.
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Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine
the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the situa-
tion in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow from
what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of
course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance....sa
Several principles were adopted to determine the appropriateness of
relief: the injunction must be appropriate in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; both parties must be contractually bound to arbitrate the grievance
and the contract must so state ;34 the employer should be ordered to arbi-
trate as a condition precedent to his obtaining injunctive relief against the
strike-" the injunction must be warranted under ordinary principles of
equity, i.e., whether the employer has been or will be caused irreparable
injury by the breaches.3 0
Although Boys Markets may have favorably restored the balance of
power between labor and management, one issue remains unresolved:
whether state courts must now apply the same principles as federal courts
in granting equitable relief? This issue will arise when management
obtains an injunction in a state court that would not have been issued in
federal court under the standards set down in Boys Markets. The union
will contend that the requirements for an injunction established by Boys
Markets should be made applicable to the states. The Supreme Court will
ultimately be called upon to resolve the issue. If the Court decides that
Boys Markets is inapplicable, uniformity in labor law will suffer due to
the different standards that state courts will inevitably establish.37 How-
33 398 U.S. at 253-54.
", That this principle must be met before injunctive relief will be granted in a
federal court is evidenced by the recent decision of Stroehmann Bros. Co. v. Local
427, Confectionary Workers, 74 LAB. REL. REP. 2957, 2960 (M.D. Pa. July 25,
1970), in which injunctive relief was denied to an employer because he and the
union were not contractually bound to arbitrate grievances.
" In Holland Constr. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs, 74 LAB. REL. REP. 3087, 3088
(D. Kan. July 27, 1970), the court referred to the requirements of Boys Markets,
and stated that "the employer should be ordered to arbitrate as a condition of ob-
taining an injunction assuming the other criteria favoring an injunction are also
present."
38370 U.S. at 228.
The doctrine of federal preemption does not necessarily arise in this context.
Although preemption usually applies when a state court attempts to resolve an
issue governed by a federal statute, the National Labor Relations Board, not a state
court, has authority to initially rule on a particular labor activity. Disputes over
labor agreements are usually left for judicial resolution, whereas, labor practices are
ruled upon by the Board. Breach of a labor contract is not considered an unfair
labor practice and is therefore left to the usual processes of the law. Stewart,
[Vol, 49
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ever, the Court, in the interest of uniformity, should hold that Boys Markets
is applicable to the states. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.38
emphasized that national labor policy could not tolerate inconsistent state
and federal court enforcement and interpretation of labor contracts:
Incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of
federal labor law . . . . The dimensions of § 301 require the con-
clusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be para-
mount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is in-
herent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the
mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind
covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal
labor policy . . . . [T]he subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly
one that calls for uniform law."39
The field of labor law stands on the threshold of a new era that promises
consistent development on both state and federal levels. Broad policies of
national interest will be the predominant concern in any labor-management
controversy. Past errors and incompatible doctrines should be cast aside
and resurrected only in historical comment. The judiciary should not take
umbrage at emerging concepts alien to past interpretations. As Justice
Stewart noted, concurring in Boys Markets, "[w] isdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."' 40
ROBERT D. Rizzo
Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment Contracts not to
Compete within the Entire United States
The North Carolina Supreme Court has now put to rest the notion
that nationwide restraints on trade were per se illegal in North Carolina.
In Harwell Enterprises, Iw. v. Heim,- the supreme court upheld a re-
No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 673, 675-76 (1961);
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONs AcT 546 (1948). The NLRB honors this
distinction. Repeatedly it has said it will not adjudicate contract violations. At
least one commentator disagrees. Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions AgainSt
Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. Rlv. 303,
316 (1968).
"8 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
'Id. at 102-03.
Justice Stewart borrowed this quote from Justice Frankfurter. 398 U.S. at
255.
'276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970).
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